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The Right to Education: Reconciling Teacher Tenure
and the Current State of Public Education
Michael J. DeJianne*
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that the administration and
implementation of the public school system is the most important function of state and local
governments. 1 Specifically, the Court’s unanimous ruling in Brown v. Board of Education
emphasized education’s significance to a child’s potential success in life and the survival of any
democratic society. 2 The decision famously held, “[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”3 These
words, though written by Chief Justice Earl Warren more than six decades ago, still hold true and
reflect this country’s enormous investment of time, money, and effort in creating an education
system with the goal of giving every child the tools necessary to succeed in life and ultimately
foster our democracy.
Though its importance is rarely called into question, the level of constitutional protection
offered to education has resulted in controversial judicial rulings.4 Some state courts elevate the
right to education as a fundamental interest5, while the United States Supreme Court6 (the Supreme
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1
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2
Id.
3
Id. (emphasis added).
4
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (holding that education is not a
fundamental right while emphasizing its high importance to society).
5
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605 (Cal. 1971) (holding that education is a fundamental right).
6
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59.
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Court) and other state courts have declined to do so. 7 Because those states and the federal
government offer a lower level of equal protection analysis to education, statutes that allegedly
detract from its quality must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.8 These
decisions helped shape this country’s state and national education policy and, some argue,
contributed to a deteriorating experience in the American classroom.9
Some of the most controversial legislation surrounding education policy is teacher tenure
statutes. Tenure is an employment protection awarded to teachers, the qualifications of which vary
by state.10 Though the right to tenure does not technically create absolute immunity from dismissal,
tenure reform advocates argue that some state statutes protect ineffective teachers from termination
and thereby directly harm the quality of education. 11 Overturning these statutes proves to be
difficult, especially when state supreme courts offer education the lowest level of equal protection
analysis.
In August of 2014, a California district court held that certain state teacher tenure statutes
violate the California Constitution.12 In Vergara v. State of California, Judge Rolf Treu held that
the challenged teacher tenure statutes detracted from the quality of California’s education and
enjoined their enforcement.13 Because California considers education a fundamental right, state
courts must apply the highest level of equal protection analysis. 14 Plaintiffs in New York

7

Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 499 (N.J. 1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right).
See, e.g., id at 499.
9
See Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public Education, 22 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 49 (2011).
10
See Arnold Shep Cohen, Striking a Balance Between Teachers’ Employment Rights and Professional
Responsibilities, 154 JUL N.J. LAW 43 (1993). (outlining various state laws regulating teacher tenure, including
probationary periods and teacher effectiveness).
11
See Nicholas Dagostino, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban Students from Teachers’ Unions,
63 Ala. L. Rev. 177, 195 (2011).
12
Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. August 27, 2014).
13
Id.
14
Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 606.
8
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subsequently challenged state teacher tenure statutes in similar fashion. 15 With the upcoming
appeal of the Vergara decision and a trial scheduled in 2015 for Davids v. New York, it is important
to analyze whether teacher tenure statutes detract from the quality of education and therefore
violate a state’s constitution.
This Comment aims to answer those questions, examine the plaintiffs’ arguments in
Vergara and Davids, and evaluate the effectiveness of New Jersey’s recent teacher tenure reform.
Parts II and III of this Comment outline federal and state equal protection analysis and the level of
protection education receives from the Supreme Court and the state courts in New Jersey, New
York, and California. Part IV examines the current landscape of teacher tenure in these states and
explains Judge Treu’s analysis in the Vergara decision. Part V then applies the plaintiffs’
arguments in Vergara and Davids to California and New York’s equal protection clauses.
Ultimately, this Comment advocates for the courts to accept the plaintiffs’ arguments, overturn the
states’ teacher tenure statutes and direct the California and New York legislatures to adopt an
approach similar to New Jersey’s recent reform. Part VI concludes.
II. How Is Equal Protection Analyzed?
A. Federal Equal Protection Analysis
Before evaluating the constitutional validity of current teacher tenure statutes as they relate
to the right to public education, it is necessary to examine courts’ equal protection clause analysis.
The Supreme Court has traditionally utilized a three-tiered test when legislation is challenged
under the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause (the Equal Protection Clause).16
First, laws that affect fundamental rights or classify individuals based on race and national origin

15

See Javier C. Hernandez, New York Teachers Fight Back on Attacks to Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/nyregion/new-york-educators-fight-back-on-attacks-to-tenure-.html.
16
See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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are subject to the highest level of scrutiny.17 Legislation that falls under this category must serve
a compelling interest and the government action must be narrowly tailored to allow the violation
of equal protection.18 Second, laws that classify individuals based on gender are traditionally
analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.19 This analysis requires the law be substantially related to
an important government interest.20 Finally, at a minimum, any statutory classification must be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.21 All laws, whether passed by Congress or
state legislatures, must meet this constitutional floor.22 Any law that fails to meet this “rational
basis” standard violates the Equal Protection Clause and will be overturned.23
B. New Jersey’s Equal Protection Analysis
Though the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis is highly influential, each state
utilizes a unique approach to its respective state constitution’s equal protection clause. The New
Jersey Constitution’s Liberty Clause (the Liberty Clause) reads, “[a]ll persons are by nature free
and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those enjoying
and defending life and liberty, or acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and of pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness.”24 While there is no express mention of equal protection, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has read this article to grant equal protection under the law.25
When a statute is challenged under the Liberty Clause, the court departs from the threetiered federal analysis and opts for a balancing test that weighs the right violated against the need

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See id. (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
Id.
See id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
Id.
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (U.S. 1959).
See id.
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006).
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for the alleged inequality.26 In Greenberg v. Kimmelman, the New Jersey Supreme Court outlined
this fluid balancing test where state courts must consider “[t]he nature of the affected right, the
extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the
restriction.”27 According to the court, this analysis uses an approach implicit in the federal test.28
Justice Pollock explained, “in [federal] equal protection analysis, the nature of the right is the
crucial consideration in characterizing a right as ‘fundamental’, the initial step in determining
whether the governmental regulation will receive ‘strict scrutiny’ or a more relaxed standard of
judicial review.”29 While the New Jersey Supreme Court’s test is less mechanical than the federal
test, it still aims to define the importance of the right and analyze the level of protection that right
receives from the Liberty Clause. This guarantees protection against unequal treatment of people
who should be treated alike, such as all students in the classroom.30
C. California’s Equal Protection Analysis
Much like New Jersey, California applies a different equal protection analysis than its
federal counterpart. California’s equal protection clause is in-depth and reads more like a statute
than a constitutional provision.31 Like the Equal Protection Clause, however, California’s equal
protection clause still ensures that “[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws.” 32 At its core, this article
promises persons who are similarly situated are treated equally under the law.33

26

See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985).
Id.
28
See id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See CAL. CONST. art I, § 7 (In 1979, the California Legislature amended this provision to specifically outline how
instruments of the state must enforce equal protection. This clearly departs from New Jersey, New York, and the
U.S. Constitution’s respective equal protection amendments, as it is much more in depth).
32
See C.A. CONST. art I, § 7(a).
33
In re Evans, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1263, 1270 (Cal Ct. App. 1996).
27
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The California Supreme Court has held that the state’s equal protection clause possesses
independent validity from the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.34 When
legislative action classifies individuals and is challenged as violating the state’s constitution,
California courts have developed a two-tiered standard of review. 35 The California Court of
Appeals explained in Molar v. Gates that strict scrutiny analysis is required for the violation of
fundamental interests or suspect classifications.36 The state must show that the violation of the
right or the classification is necessary to accomplish a compelling interest.37 California does not
recognize a distinction between classifications of race or gender.38 Instead, the state analyzes these
classifications under the same level of scrutiny.39 All other legislation must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose, meeting the constitutional floor the U.S. Supreme Court
requires.40
D. New York’s Equal Protection Analysis
New York’s Constitution extends equal protection of state laws to all persons and prohibits
the violation of an individual’s civil rights. 41

When statutes are challenged under this

constitutional provision, the New York Court of Appeals opts to use an analysis that closely
resembles the Supreme Court’s three-tiered test.42 First, strict scrutiny is appropriate in New York
for an alleged discrimination based on suspect classification or violation of a fundamental

34

See, e.g., Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d. 458, 469 (Cal. 1979).
See, Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d. 1, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., Sail’er Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d. 1 (Cal. 1974) (holding that a California statute prohibiting women
from obtaining bartender licenses compels the application of strict scrutiny analysis and ultimately violates the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution).
39
Id.
40
Molar, 98 Cal. App. 3d. at 13.
41
N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11.
42
See Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Schl. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y.
1978).
35
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interest. 43 Second, in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, the New York Court of Appeals
explained intermediate scrutiny, or the “sliding scale” test.44 The court first must ask if the alleged
discrimination satisfies a substantial state interest and furthers a legitimate government purpose.45
If the interest is served by the discrimination or violation of rights, the court must then answer if
the objectives could be achieved by less offensive means.46 Third, similar to the federal analysis,
all classifications must at least be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.47
III. Is There a Right to an Education?
A. The Guarantee of an Equal Education
The administration of public schools largely falls on state and municipal governments.48
While some argue that the United States Department of Education has taken strides towards
creating a national education policy,49 state constitutions, particularly New Jersey, California, and
New York, require their respective legislatures provide free schooling to all children. 50 The
practical effect of this constitutional obligation has led to legislatures passing numerous statutes
that regulate nearly every aspect of operating a statewide education system. 51 These include
mechanisms for funding each school district, education standards for student advancement, and
evaluation criteria for teacher and administrative job performance. 52 These statutes show that

43

Id. at 635.
See Alevy v. Downstate Med. Ctr., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336 (N.Y. 1976).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
48
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7 (1973).
49
See Sarah G. Boyce, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake of the Federal Government’s
Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1027 (2012).
50
CAL. CONST. art. IX, §1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 1.
51
See, e.g., School Funding Reform Act, N.J. STAT. Ann. § 18A:7F-44 (West 2008) (outlining the structure and
calculations used to fund New Jersey’s public school system for all children between the ages of five and eighteen).
52
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44830 (West 2009) (outlining the employment qualifications for public school teachers);
see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-44; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3220 (McKinney 2008) (requiring all students to
participate in physical fitness exams during the academic year).
44
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education policy is, very much so, a state and local concern. When individuals believe this
legislation detracts from the state’s educational experience, the laws are challenged as violating
the state’s guarantee of an education.53
Legal precedent in this area evaluates if government benefits or programs are elevated to
fundamental rights. States provide many services that its citizens need, some of which are
mandated by the state constitution.54 For example, the New York Constitution requires the state
legislature maintain a public welfare system in support of the needy. 55 While this is certainly an
important role for the government, the New York Court of Appeals has held that public welfare in
not a fundamental right.56 Likewise, education is not elevated to a fundamental right in many
states, and therefore receives a lower level of protection under a state’s equal protection clause.57
But, as the Supreme Court explained, state laws that violate equal protection must always bear at
least some rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.58 Therefore, in states where
education is not a fundamental right, laws cannot go below this constitutional floor and detract
from a basic level of education.
Many landmark judicial decisions regarding the administration of education have focused
on state funding mechanisms. 59 In New Jersey, California, and New York, the public school
system is primarily funded by general revenue raised through property and income taxes.60 Those

53

See, e.g., Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 (challenging the constitutionality of the education funding system in Texas).
See N.Y. CONST. art XVII §1 (requiring the New York State Legislature to provide public support to the needy).
55
Id.
56
Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 651 (N.Y. 1982).
57
See, e.g., id. (holding that education is not a fundamental right in New York).
58
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (U.S. 1959).
59
See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (N.J. 1973) (challenging the constitutionality of the education funding
system used in New Jersey).
60
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8(requiring that state revenue be set aside for public school funding); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:7F; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602 (McKinney 2014) (requiring public money be made available to each school
district from state and local revenue).
54
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opposed to the funding scheme have argued that poorer school districts do not have access to
adequate tax revenue, resulting in an inferior educational experience that violates the state’s
constitutional obligation and equal protection.61 Key cases from New Jersey, California, and New
York are helpful to summarize for purposes of this Comment. Each decision discussed infra
outlines the obligation to provide an education and analyzes whether the respective constitutional
provisions recognize a fundamental right. This will ultimately provide a framework to discuss
whether the challenged teacher tenure statutes violate the state constitution.
B. The Supreme Court’s View
There is neither an explicit nor an implicit guarantee to education under the United States
Constitution. 62 The U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with this question in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 63 At trial, plaintiffs argued that the Texas public
education financing system, through the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program (Program),
violated the Equal Protection Clause.64 The Program was designed in response the development
of industrial cities and population shifts, which resulted in many rural Texas communities lacking
sufficient funding for public schools. 65 The legislature understood disparities in expenditures
harmed the quality of education in rural districts and passed legislation designed to increase
funding. 66 The Program supplied funds to school districts from general state revenue, which
financed each district with roughly eighty percent of the annual school budget.67 The remaining
funds came directly from the district’s budget by way of local property taxes, calculated as a

61
62
63
64
65
66
67

See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1973).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id.
Id. at 11–12
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11–12.

10

percentage of residential and commercial property value.68 The goal of the Program was twofold:
(1) place the heaviest burden on school districts most capable of paying and (2) ensure that every
school district contributes to the education of its children without completely exhausting local
resources.69
The plaintiffs came from Edgewood, the least affluent district in the San Antonio area.70
Because of low property values and limited municipal resources, the district could only contribute
$26 to the education of each student for the 1967–1968 academic year.71 With the contribution
from the Texas state revenue, total expenditures per student for the year were $248.72 At trial,
plaintiffs introduced the 1967–1968 expenditures of Alamo Heights, the most affluent district in
the San Antonio area.73 Because of greater property values and state contribution, Alamo Heights
was able to supply $594 per pupil.74 The federal district court concluded the Program failed strict
scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause on the basis that an individual’s wealth is a
suspect classification and education is a fundamental right.75
The majority overturned the district court on two separate grounds. 76 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell explained that plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the financing system
discriminated against a definable group of impoverished people and led to a total lack of
education.77 It was unclear to the majority if the Program discriminated against all poor people,

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 12–13.
72
Id.
73
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12–13.
74
Id. at 11–12.
75
Id. at 16.
76
Id. at 18.
77
Id. at 23–25.
69
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all people with lower property values, or the ten percent of Texas school districts surveyed for
purposes of trial.78 The Court therefore concluded the financing system did not disadvantage a
suspect class.79
The majority then held that education is not a fundamental right that requires a higher level
of scrutiny.80 Justice Powell explained that education is vital in a free society, both to individual
citizens and the country as a whole.81 The importance of a state function, however, does “not
determine whether [that function] must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination
under the Equal Protection Clause.” 82 Fundamental rights are afforded by a guarantee in the
Constitution, while economic and social rights call for a lower level of scrutiny under equal
protection analysis.83 Because it is not explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, the
Court concluded that education is not a fundamental right.84

C. New Jersey’s View
The New Jersey Supreme Court confronted a similar public school funding issue in the
same year as the Rodriguez decision. 85

In Robinson v. Cahill, plaintiffs challenged the

constitutionality of New Jersey’s public school financing plan.86 Much like Texas’ Program, New

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 26–27.
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
See id. at 34–35.
Id.
See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (N.J. 1973).
Id. at 480.
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Jersey’s public schools received funding from general state revenue and local property taxes.87
This resulted in a disparity of dollars spent per pupil, particularly in areas where property values
were low. 88 The plaintiffs argued this inequality violated a student’s fundamental right to an
education, asking the court to overturn the funding scheme on the basis of the Liberty Clause.89
In addition to the guarantee of equal protection through the Liberty Clause, the New Jersey
Constitution requires the legislature supply a “thorough and efficient” public school system to all
children.90 Plaintiffs urged the court to invoke the highest level of scrutiny when evaluating the
funding scheme’s violation of this constitutional provision.91 The plaintiffs specifically pointed to
the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez that elevated explicit constitutional guarantees to the
level of fundamental rights.92 The plaintiffs argued that the holding in Rodriguez only bolstered
Chief Justice Warren’s unanimous decision in Brown, where the Court held “[s]uch an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”93
The New Jersey Supreme Court used the Rodriguez decision as a guide in its analysis and
held the funding disparities neither violated a fundamental right nor invoked the highest level of
scrutiny under the Liberty Clause.94 Chief Justice Weintraub explained that the guarantee of an
efficient education does not mandate a uniform expenditure plan.95 The constitutional guarantee
implicitly involves municipal participation, which undoubtedly leads to varying budgets and

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 482.
N.J. CONST. art. VII § 4.
Robinson, 623 N.J. at 496.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
See Robinson, 623 N.J. at 495.
Id. at 499.
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expenditures.96 While involvement at the state level is constitutionally mandated, the funding
disparities that result from the statutory scheme are not “irrational” and do not invoke a higher
level of scrutiny.97 Therefore, the requirement to furnish a service does not automatically elevate
the state’s obligation to a fundamental right.98
D. New York’s View
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, New York’s public school funding scheme
faced numerous challenges in the Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School Dist., Nassau
County. v. Nyquist line of cases.99 Like New Jersey and Texas, New York’s funding scheme
resulted in disparities where property values were low.100 In the case’s final disposition, the New
York Court of Appeals looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez and ultimately held
that education is not a fundamental right.101 Justice Jones explained that public education is one
of the most important services the state performs, a notion expressly manifested in the New York
State Constitution.102 As mentioned supra, however, dedication to a government program does
not automatically elevate the level of scrutiny to that of a fundamental right. 103

Other

constitutionally mandated programs, such as public assistance to the needy, are also highly
important but do not call for a higher level of scrutiny. 104 Strict or intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate only when the state action groups persons together by reason of personal

96

Id. at 493–494.
Id. at 499.
98
Id.
99
Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y. 1978),
modified by Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y.
1981), modified by Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643
(N.Y. 1982).
100
See Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
101
Id. at 651–652.
102
N.Y. CONST. art XI §1; Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
103
Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
104
N.Y. CONST. art XVII §1; Nyquist 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
97
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characteristics, such as race or gender.105 For these reasons, the court held that the proper standard
of review for purported violations of the right to education in New York is rational basis.106
E. California’s View
California’s view of public education departs from the holdings in Rodriguez, Robinson,
and Nyquist.107 In Serrano v. Priest, California’s public school funding statutes encountered a
challenge for violating California’s equal protection clause.108 Similar to challenges in New York
and New Jersey, plaintiffs attacked the statutes for creating funding disparities that resulted in
substandard educational opportunities for students living in school districts with lower property
values.109 The plaintiffs argued this violated a fundamental right.110
The California Supreme Court believed the plaintiffs’ claims had legal merit and remanded
the proceedings for trial.111 Writing for the majority, Justice Sullivan held that the right to public
education in California is a fundamental interest, requiring a higher level of scrutiny for an alleged
violation.112 In support of this conclusion, the court pointed to Chief Justice Warren’s decision in
Brown. 113 Justice Sullivan explained that the majority in Brown espoused two themes when
speaking about the importance of education: (1) the importance to individuals and (2) the
importance to society. 114 Both of these themes directly impact the success of America’s
democracy, and are supported by the language in California’s Constitution: “A general diffusion

105

Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
Id.
107
See, e.g. Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 584 (Cal. 1971)
108
Id.
109
Id. at 588.
110
Id at 589.
111
Id. at 618.
112
Id. at 605–606.
113
Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 606 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954));
Interestingly, Chief Justice Earl Warren served as Governor of California from 1943–1953.
114
Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 606.
106
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of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”115 Because of the “distinctive and priceless” role
education serves in our society, the majority held that the right to education is a fundamental
interest that requires the highest level of scrutiny and protection.116
F. What Really Affects a Student’s Education?
The plaintiffs in the preceding cases attacked education funding plans in Texas, New Jersey,
California, and New York. 117 With the exception of California, the courts largely rejected
plaintiffs’ arguments that education deserves heightened constitutional protection.118 The courts
held that disparities in funding do not violate a fundamental right, while recognizing education’s
significance to society. 119 As mentioned supra, education’s importance is exemplified by this
country’s commitment of time, money, and effort in educating every child. Even though it is not
considered a fundamental right in every state, this commitment compels legislatures to ensure that
laws governing education policy meet the required level of equal protection, even if that level is
the “constitutional floor.”120 Laws that fail to meet the standard and detract from a student’s
education must therefore be overturned.121

115

CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 608.
Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 608–609.
117
San Antonio Indep.Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d 584; Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473 (N.J. 1973); Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643
(N.Y. 1982).
118
Id.
119
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 493 (N.J.
1973); Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 651 (N.Y.
1982).
120
See Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (U.S. 1959).
121
Id.
116
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Though funding is an important aspect of operating state public school systems, it is not
the primary influence on education’s quality.122 For example, some statistics show that Newark,
New Jersey spends about $22,000 per pupil, while only twenty-two percent of students graduate
high school.123 In comparison, Chatham, New Jersey spends $11,000 per pupil and has a high
school graduation rate of virtually 100%.124 Some may argue that comparing New Jersey’s largest
city to a small suburb creates an inaccurate portrayal of Newark’s school system. But the facts
cannot be ignored: Newark, and many cities like it, spends huge sums of money on its public
school system with extremely disappointing results. Therefore other factors have as much, if not
more, influence on a child’s education.
The Supreme Court has recognized some of these other factors that affect public
education’s quality.125 In Brown, the Court famously struck down the segregation of children in
public schools based on race.126 Even if facilities were “tangibly” equal, the psychological effect
of separating students based on physical characteristics negatively impacts students’ education.127
The Court therefore recognized that environmental factors have an impact on education’s
quality.128
The Supreme Court also held that facilities and materials play an important role in
education’s quality.129 In Sweatt v. Painter, the plaintiff was denied admission to the University
of Texas Law School based on his race. 130 Texas operated a law school solely for African

122

Dagostino supra note 11, at 180.
Id.
124
NJ SCHOOL PERFORMANCE REPORT, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CHATHAMS (2014), available at
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Americans, something that the Texas Court of Civil Appeals felt was an appropriate remedy for
the plaintiff.131 The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the University of Texas to admit the
plaintiff to its law school.132 In its analysis, the Court compared the schools’ facilities. 133 The
University of Texas had access to scholarship funds, moot court facilities, and 65,000 volumes in
its library.134 The African American law school had no faculty, almost no volumes in its library,
and lacked accreditation. 135 The Court held that the insufficient facilities detracted from the
plaintiff’s legal education and therefore violated his constitutional rights.136 Implicit in its decision,
Painter recognizes that facilities and academic materials have an effect on one’s education.137
While funding, environmental factors, facilities and materials all play a vital role in a public
school, effective teachers are the most important aspect of an education.138 A teacher has the most
lasting impact on a student’s education, with some studies showing that students with effective
teachers earn more money, are less likely to have children in their teens, and are nearly twice as
likely to attend college.139 According to the same study, an ineffective teacher could result in
almost $2.5 million of lost lifetime earnings.140 Providing the best teachers for students only seems
logical with these results; however, some argue that teacher tenure statutes directly detract from
this goal by protecting ineffective teachers’ positions.141 If teachers detract from the classroom
experience and are protected from termination, then this may have constitutional implications even
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at the lowest equal protection analysis. This leads us to an important discussion about teacher
tenure and its effect on the classroom experience.
IV. The Current Landscape of Teacher Tenure
A. What is Tenure?
Tenure was initially established to provide protection from random termination and create
a degree of permanency and expertise within the teaching profession.142 Tenure guarantees that
an employee can only be dismissed for cause after a hearing is held and a decision is rendered by
the state’s education agency.143 Contrary to popular belief, tenure for public school teachers is not
absolute immunity from being terminated.144 As explained in Donahoo v. Board of Education, the
goal of tenure is to ensure the best teachers continue service and are protected from termination
based on arbitrary or capricious reasons.145 Proponents of tenure argue that this protection adds
value to the classroom experience, while opponents believe it restricts the ability of administrators
to effectively shape state education policies and standards.146 Laws regulating the hearing process
vary by state; however, the charges an individual teacher may face for termination are less
variable.147 Therefore, it is possible for a tenured teacher’s position to be terminated.148
B. Efforts at Tenure Reform: The TEACHNJ Act
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The recent economic downturn, shrinking state budgets, and underperforming schools
brought tenure reform to the forefront. 149 Many states passed legislation modifying teacher
evaluations, extending the probationary period before teachers become tenure-eligible, and
eliminating the highly controversial “last-in, first-out” seniority system utilized for school
layoffs. 150 New Jersey was not immune to these problems, and Republican Governor Chris
Christie felt that tenure reform would help improve some of the state’s ailing school districts.151
After a highly publicized fight between Governor Christie, the Democratic controlled legislature,
and the New Jersey Education Association, all three eventually worked together to create the first
comprehensive tenure reform in New Jersey since 1909.152
In 2012, New Jersey passed the New Jersey’s Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability
for the Children of New Jersey (the “TEACHNJ Act”) for the 2013–2014 academic year.153 The
TEACHNJ Act addresses the probationary period and evaluation process for public school
teachers in New Jersey.154 As mandated by the law, teachers become eligible for tenure after one
year of mentorship with an experienced teacher followed by two positive evaluations over the
following three years.155 The new evaluation system rates teachers as “ineffective,” “partially
effective,” “effective,” or “highly effective.”
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administrators completes the evaluations, balancing both subjective and objective factors.157 Once
tenure is earned, two consecutive years of an “ineffective” rating result in a loss of tenure.158 The
teacher then must have two consecutive years of “effective” or “highly effective” ratings in order
to avoid dismissal.159 Further, the costs of a dismissal hearing are capped at $7,500.160 According
to supporters of the TEACHNJ Act, this allows administrators and state regulators to proceed
against an ineffective teacher without being discouraged by expensive and ongoing litigation, a
problem that existed before the law’s passage.161
C. Legal Challenges Brought Against Teacher Tenure
a. Vergara v. The State of California
The same year New Jersey passed the TEACHNJ Act, tenure reformers in California
mounted a legal battle in Vergara v. California.162 The plaintiffs challenged five statutes from the
California Education Code that allegedly violated the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution. 163

The statutes included California Education Code: (1) §44929.21(b) (the

“Permanent Employment Statute”); (2) §44934 and §44938(b)(1)-(2) (“Dismissal Statutes”); and
(3) §44955 (“Last-In, First-Out Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”).164 The plaintiffs argued that each
statute protected ineffective teachers from dismissal, which contributed to a failing education
system within their respective school districts.165 Because education is considered a fundamental
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right in California the plaintiffs believed the statutes failed under the strict scrutiny analysis and
violated the guarantee of equal protection under the California Constitution.166
Arguing before Judge Treu, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the Permanent
Employment Statute disadvantaged both students and competent teachers.167 As mandated by the
statute, teachers are informed of their tenure status at the end of a two-year probationary period.168
In practice, the decision must be communicated by March 15 of the second year, three months
before the end of the academic term.169 This requires administrators make the actual decision well
before the March 15 deadline.170 The teacher simultaneously undergoes a credentialing process
during the first two years of employment; however, that decision cannot be made until the actual
expiration of the second academic term.171 The inconsistency can, and has, resulted in a district’s
having a tenured teacher without state credentials.172 Plaintiffs also presented evidence that if
there was any doubt of a teacher’s ability, time constraints forced administrators to make a tenure
decision without adequate opportunity for the teacher to prove competence.173
Judge Treu held that this statute unfairly affected both students and teachers.174 Because
education is considered a fundamental right in California, the state must offer a compelling reason
for students to be deprived of potentially competent teachers and for teachers to not have enough
time to prove their abilities within the classroom.175 Judge Treu found that the state failed its
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burden and held the Permanent Employment Statute violated the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution.176
Judge Treu also found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the equal protection clause of
the California Constitution.177 Plaintiffs presented evidence that a California dismissal hearing
may take up to ten years and will cost a school district between $50,000 and $450,000.178 During
trial, defense witnesses admitted that was is nearly “impossible” to terminate a tenured teacher’s
position under the current statutory scheme. 179 The state argued that a teacher, or any public
employee, is entitled to due process during a dismissal hearing, making the Dismissal Statutes
necessary.180
Judge Treu agreed that due process is a right, but explained that other certified school
employees must only be made aware of their dismissal charges and be given the right to respond
at a hearing. 181 Judge Treu found no compelling reason to give teachers extra due process
protections afforded by the challenged statutes, particularly when the result keeps ineffective
teachers employed.182 While teachers, and other public employees, have a right to due process,
this right cannot detract from the fundamental right afforded to California’s students.183 For these
reasons, the court found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an
education and the state’s equal protection clause.184
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Lastly, Judge Treu found the LIFO Statutes resulted in extreme “classroom disruption” and
agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the provision violated a student’s constitutional rights.185
When school layoffs are necessary, the LIFO Statutes regulates teacher dismissals.186 The lasthired teacher is the first dismissed, without consideration of the teacher’s quality or
effectiveness.187 Judge Treu explained the defendants would need to present a compelling reason
for the “de facto retention of incompetent [teachers]” in order to defend the LIFO Statutes’
existence.188 Judge Treu found the logic of the defendant’s position to be “unfathomable”.189
California recognizes education as a fundamental right that requires the highest level of equal
protection analysis. 190 Automatically keeping ineffective teachers in the classroom directly
impacts education’s quality, violating students’ constitutional rights.191 For these reasons, Judge
Treu held the LIFO Statutes failed strict scrutiny analysis.192
b. Davids v. The State of New York
Shortly after Judge Treu decided Vergara, two separate lawsuits were filed in New York
challenging the state’s teacher tenure statutes.193 In Wright v. New York and Davids v. New York,
plaintiffs submitted complaints arguing that thirteen New York Education Law statutes keep
ineffective teachers in the classroom and infringe upon a student’s fundamental right to a sound
and basic education.194 Similar to the tenure provisions in Vergara, the plaintiffs in Wright and
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Davids challenged New York Education Laws: (1) §2509, §2573, and §3012 (“Permanent
Employment Statutes”); (2) §3020 ( “Dismissal Statutes”); and (3) §2585 and §3013 ( “Last-In,
First-Out Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”). 195 Because the two lawsuits have similar arguments
against the same statutes, Judge Phillip Minardo granted the New York Attorney General’s motion
to consolidate the cases.196 With a trial date currently set for early 2015, plaintiffs will now argue
solely under Davids v. New York.197
V. Do the Challenged Tenure Statutes Violate a Right to Education?
The plaintiffs in Vergara will have their arguments tested in an upcoming appeal, while
the plaintiffs in Davids must argue in a state that offers education the lowest level of equal
protection analysis.198 Both New York and California have recognized education’s importance
and the integral role teachers play in a child’s academic development. 199 The courts, therefore,
must determine if the challenged teacher tenure statutes detract from a student’s education and
survive the state’s equal protection analysis.

A. California Should Uphold Vergara
Tenure reform advocates viewed the Vergara decision as a victory, while teacher unions
across the nation accused Judge Treu of blaming teachers for failing educational institutions.200 In
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response to the court’s opinion, California Governor Jerry Brown appealed the decision,
explaining, “[c]hanges of this magnitude, as a matter of law and policy, require appellate
review.” 201 As explained supra, the California Supreme Court has held that education is a
fundamental right.202 This affords students the highest level of scrutiny under equal protection
analysis, requiring a violation of that right be necessary and narrowly tailored to accomplish a
compelling interest.203 Further, teachers are the most important aspect of a student’s education.204
An effective teacher leads to the heightened possibility of personal and professional success. 205
While teacher tenure is certainly good public policy in order to ensure some level of employment
protection and expertise in the profession, there is no compelling reason for that protection to
infringe upon a fundamental right, particularly when the effects on a student are potentially
disastrous. For this reason, the appellate division of the superior court should uphold the decision
in Vergara and force the California legislature to reform state teacher tenure statutes.
California’s Permanent Employment Statute, Dismissal Statutes, and LIFO Statute violate
the California Constitution and conflict with tenure’s goal of providing a level of expertise within
the profession.206 The plaintiffs’ evidence shows that a teacher: (1) is granted tenure after an
inadequate amount of time; (2) is afforded due process protection that makes it nearly impossible
to be dismissed; and (3) is automatically protected during school layoffs regardless of the teacher’s
quality or effectiveness.207 This creates a system where ineffective teachers are granted tenure and
are protected from termination.
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The Permanent Employment Statue forces administrators to evaluate a teacher’s
effectiveness in an inadequate time period.208 In practice, the statute uses one full academic year
as the primary criteria for granting tenure.209 Dr. John Deasy, Superintendent of the Los Angeles
School District, testified that the mandated time period is insufficient to determine tenure
eligibility. 210 Both the plaintiffs and defendants offered evidence that a three to five year
probationary period would be better suited to evaluate a teacher’s abilities.211 As mentioned supra,
administrators use only one full year of evaluations to determine a teacher’s eligibility for
tenure.212 Because of the short timeframe, the Permanent Employment Statute creates a possibility
that ineffective teachers are granted tenure. The results ultimately detract from California’s
education, harm students and violate the state’s equal protection clause.
The Dismissal Statutes discourage administrators from pursuing the termination of an
ineffective teacher due to the unnecessarily heightened due process procedures.213 The plaintiffs
submitted evidence that a dismissal proceeding can cost upwards of $450,000, and defense
witnesses testified that the termination of a tenured teacher is “extremely rare.”214 The high cost
of litigation caused by the mandated process discourages administrators from pursuing a
dismissal.215 This only protects ineffective teachers and detracts from education in California.
The LIFO Statutes are another example of California’s protection of ineffective teachers.
When layoffs occur, no weight is given to a teacher’s effectiveness or abilities; rather, seniority is
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the sole criterion used for dismissals.216 This conceivably could lead to a situation where a highly
effective teacher with ten years of experience is dismissed instead of an ineffective teacher with
eleven years of experience. The defendants could not offer a logical reason why such a system
should exist.217 As explained by Judge Treu, the defendants’ position requires them to argue that
a competent teacher’s position should be terminated over an ineffective teacher’s simply because
of his or her hire date.218 As with the Permanent Employment Statute and Dismissal Statutes, the
LIFO Statute detracts from the quality of education and violates equal protection in California.
Under California’s strict scrutiny analysis, the defendants fail to show the challenged
statutes are necessary for a compelling state interest.219 The legislature’s goal to protect teacher
employment cannot trump the constitutional obligation to provide all students with an education,
particularly when the quality of education is negatively impacted. Granting tenure to ineffective
teachers, and subsequent protection from dismissal, violates a fundamental right and detracts from
expertise within the profession. The challenged statutes, therefore, violate the equal protection
clause of California’s Constitution and directly undermine tenure’s goals. For these reasons, the
appellate court should uphold Judge Treu’s decision and overturn the statutes.
B. The Current NY Statutes Should Be Overturned
As mentioned supra, the Court of Appeals of New York held in Nyquist that education is
not a fundamental right.220 Therefore, an alleged violation under the state’s equal protection clause
need only be rationally related to an important government interest.221 In Campaign for Fiscal
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Equity v. New York, the court established the constitutional floor that needs to be met in order for
the legislature to meet its obligation to provide an education. 222 Judge Pigott explained that
schools must teach “the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children
to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury.”223
In order for the plaintiffs in Davids to succeed, they must demonstrate a causal connection between
the challenged statutes and a failure to provide students with a sound and basic education.224 If
the court finds the statutes serve a legitimate government interest, the plaintiffs will ultimately
fail.225
The plaintiffs in Davids outline tenure’s effect on education in New York and argue that
the state’s Permanent Employment Statutes, Dismissal Statutes, and LIFO Statutes violate a
student’s right to a sound education.226 Much like California’s challenged statutes, the plaintiffs
offered evidence that the evaluation process for granting tenure is inadequate, that high litigation
costs discourage administrators from dismissing ineffective teachers, and that seniority is the only
factor considered during school layoffs.227 Plaintiffs argue that effective teachers are the primary
“input” of a sound education, explaining that “students taught by an effective teacher are more
likely to attend college, earn higher salaries, reside in higher quality neighborhoods, and save for
retirement.”228 Because the challenged statutes keep ineffective teachers in the classroom, they
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directly contribute to the legislature’s failure to provide a basic education. 229 Therefore, the
plaintiffs’ rights under the New York Constitution are violated.230
Plaintiffs argue New York’s Permanent Employment Statutes ensure that ineffective
teachers are almost guaranteed tenure. 231 Tenure is conferred to a teacher after two, annual
performance evaluations during a three-year probationary period. 232 Administrators use the
Annual Professional Performance Review (“APPR”) to evaluate performance.233 Teachers are
rated as “Highly Effective,” “Effective,” “Developing,” or “Ineffective.” 234 Student academic
growth accounts for twenty percent of a teacher’s rating, while in-class observation and local
achievement metrics account for the remaining eighty percent. 235 Plaintiffs argue that the
inadequate probationary period and the APPR’s focus on subjective factors result in ineffective
teachers earning tenure. 236

An administrator cannot reasonably determine the long-term

effectiveness of a teacher within three years, an the focus of teacher evaluations should not be
reliant on subjective factors.237 In 2012, for example, 91.5% of New York teachers were rated as
“Highly Effective” or “Effective,” while only 31% of students met standardized test proficiency
in English and Mathematics.238 These results do not support the position that students are being
provided a basic education under the standard established in Fiscal Equity.239 If the plaintiffs can
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show that the Permanent Employment Statutes inadequately rate teachers and directly harm
education, the statute will likely fail under the rational basis test.
Plaintiffs also claim that the Dismissal Statutes require a number of unnecessary hurdles to
be cleared before a teacher’s employment is terminated, leaving ineffective teachers in the
classroom. 240 New York’s public employees are afforded due process rights before being
dismissed.241 An employer must provide notice and the right to respond before the termination is
effective.242 According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the Dismissal Statutes provide teachers in New
York with “super due process” that results in years of expensive litigation.243 One study cited in
the complaint concluded that the average dismissal costs $313,000 and can last two and a half
years.244 This discourages administrators from even attempting to remove a tenured teacher.245
Because this results in ineffective teachers remaining in New York classrooms, the statute will
most likely fail to meet the constitutional floor established by courts.
Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that the LIFO Statutes protect ineffective teachers from facing
dismissal and harm students’ right to a sound and basic education.246 The New York LIFO Statutes
require administrators to only consider seniority as the determinant for dismissal when school
layoffs are necessary. 247 No consideration is given to teacher quality or effectiveness. 248 As
mentioned earlier, tenure’s goal is to retain a level of expertise within the profession. The LIFO
Statutes also offer employment protection to effective teachers who have seniority. This obviously
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adds to the quality of education in New York. An automatic protection for senior teachers,
however, is not the only way to achieve this goal. The defendants in Davids will need to argue
that ineffective teachers with seniority should remain employed over more junior effective teachers
during school layoffs.249 This position is untenable. Because the LIFO Statutes keep ineffective
teachers in the classroom, the quality of education is negatively affected and ultimately violates
the state constitution.250
Though New York offers the right to education the lowest level of equal protection analysis,
the court in Davids should overturn the Permanent Employment Statutes, Dismissal Statutes, and
LIFO Statutes.251 Plaintiffs offered much evidence to suggest the challenged statutes fail to meet
the constitutional floor described in Fiscal Equity.252 Because education is not a fundamental right,
legislation affecting its quality needs only to serve a legitimate government interest; however it
still must meet this constitutional floor.253 While providing job security to teachers adds to the
expertise within the profession, the current legislation in New York is not the best way to meet
this goal. Keeping ineffective teachers in the classroom only hurts students and does not fulfill
the legislature’s obligation to provide a sound and basic education. For these reasons, the court in
Davids should find the challenged statutes unconstitutional and direct the legislature to reform
state tenure laws.
C. Balancing Tenure and Education
Though it has only been in effect for one full academic year, the TEACHNJ Act is an
example of how California and New York can balance job protection, state equal protection
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requirements and the state’s obligation to provide an education.254 The law ensures that earning
tenure in New Jersey is no longer a rubberstamp process, where the only requirement is surviving
a three-year probationary period.255 The law requires a more thoughtful evaluation of a teacher’s
skills and training throughout four years. 256 The evaluations are regulated by uniform state
standards and are administered by various education experts and professionals.257 Once tenure is
earned, the benefit is not conferred for life.258 Teachers who fail to remain effective throughout
their careers may lose tenure, however, this does not happen immediately.259 The teacher has two
years to prove his or her effectiveness in the classroom after tenure is lost.260 This balances the
employment interests of teachers and allows the state to provide students with the best possible
educators.
New Jersey’s approach would most likely pass the constitutional standards of both
California and New York while positively contributing to each state’s ailing school districts.
California and New York approach the constitutional obligation to education differently; however,
each state’s high court recognizes education’s importance. 261 Because teachers have the most
influence on a student’s education, legislatures must ensure that the most effective teachers remain
in the classroom. 262 New Jersey’s tenure model serves both California’s high constitutional
standard and New York’s requirement to provide a “sound and basic” education.263 Instituting a
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comprehensive evaluation process and protecting effective teachers only adds to the educational
experience, protects student’s rights, and fulfills California’s and New York’s commitment to
providing an education to their students.
VI. Conclusion
State and federal courts have consistently recognized education’s importance to society.264
While each jurisdiction has differing views of the constitutional obligation to provide an education,
New York, New Jersey and California agree that there is a level of education that must be available
to all students.265 Even at the lowest level of equal protection analysis, state courts and legislatures
are obligated to ensure that laws bear some rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.
When teacher tenure statutes interfere with the classroom experience and create disruption in a
student’s learning environment, those laws fail both strict scrutiny and rational basis review and
therefore must be changed. For these reasons, the challenged teacher tenure statutes in California
and New York should be overturned and a new statutory scheme, like the TEACHNJ Act, should
be instituted.
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